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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2029 
___________ 
 
LAMAR BROWN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT SHANNON, Superintendent at Frackville State Prison;  
WENEROWICSZ, Deputy Superintendent; A. KOVALCHIK, Deputy Superintendent; 
S.K. KEPHAR, Deputy Superintendent, SHARON LUQUIS, Hearing Examiner;  
J.A. MIRANDA, Unit Manager; ROSADO, Unit Manager; DUSEL, Captain;  
LT. POPSON; MIRARCHI, CO II Sergeant; ALSHEFSKI, Correctional Officer; 
ALBERT, Correctional Officer; CORBY; SABO, Correctional Officer,  
PETER DAMITTER, Grievance Coordinator 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 10-cv-00149) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 13, 2014 
Before:  JORDAN, COWEN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 14, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Lamar Brown, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting 
summary judgment for the defendants in his civil rights action.  Brown also seeks review 
of an order precluding him from filing a second amended complaint.  We will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
 The record reflects that on January 29, 2008, Brown was issued a misconduct 
report for refusing to take down a towel that was covering his cell door.  Shortly 
thereafter, Brown was issued a second misconduct report for aggressive behavior while 
being escorted to the Restricted Housing Unit.  Brown was found guilty of misconduct 
and sanctioned to a total of 90 days in disciplinary custody.  
 Brown filed a complaint in District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming 
that correctional officers used excessive force during the escort by pushing him, tackling 
him to the ground, and spraying him with oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray) while he 
was restrained in handcuffs.  He sought monetary damages.  Brown later filed an 
amended complaint and attached as exhibits grievance forms related to his excessive 
force claim and evidence of his appeals related to the finding of misconduct.
1
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Brown also raised constitutional claims related to the issuance of the misconduct reports, 
his disciplinary hearing, and the handling of his grievance.  The District Court granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims and Brown does not challenge the dismissal 
on appeal. 
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 The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Brown had 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his excessive force claim.  In 
support, the defendants submitted the declaration of Keri Moore, a Grievance Review 
Officer who reviews appeals at the final level of administrative review.  Moore attested 
that the grievance tracking system showed that Brown had filed two grievances in 2008, 
neither of which involved the January 29, 2008 incident.  Peter Damiter, the person 
responsible for responding to grievances at Brown’s institution, attested that he did not 
receive a grievance from Brown regarding the January 29, 2008 incident. 
 Brown responded that he was not required or permitted to file a grievance because 
his excessive force claim is related to an incident resulting in a misconduct report and 
that his remedy was under the policy governing inmate discipline.  Brown also argued 
that, even though he was not required or permitted to file a grievance, he tried to use the 
grievance process.  Brown submitted, as he did with his amended complaint, a copy of a 
grievance dated February 1, 2008 complaining of the use of excessive force, a grievance 
dated February 11, 2008 seeking to appeal to the Superintendent and stating that he did 
not receive a response to his February 1, 2008 grievance, and a grievance dated February 
25, 2008 seeking to appeal to the final level of administrative review.  Brown stated that 
he did not receive a response from the Superintendent and that he doubted that his 
February 25, 2008 appeal was received. 
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 The District Court concluded that Brown had failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies because his allegation of a timely submitted grievance was unsupported and the 
grievance form dated February 1, 2008 did not reflect that it had been filed.  The District 
Court noted that the form did not include a tracking number, that prison authorities had 
no record of its filing, and that Brown had produced no evidence showing that the guards 
mishandled the grievance or his appeals.  The District Court also noted that Brown had 
not exhausted his administrative remedies through his appeals of the finding of 
misconduct because he did not raise his excessive force claim in those appeals and the 
appeals were found untimely.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review is de 
novo.  Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 As recognized by the District Court, the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a 
prisoner to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing an action regarding 
prison conditions.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Small, 728 F.3d at 268.  Under § 1997e(a), a 
prisoner must properly exhaust such remedies by complying with the prison grievance 
system’s procedural rules.  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95 (2006); Spruill v. 
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  Here, those rules required, among other things, 
the submission of a grievance to the grievance coordinator at the facility where the 
grievance occurred.  See Exhibit C-1 to Summary Judgment Motion.   
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 Brown argues that it is unclear whether he was permitted to raise his excessive 
force claim in a grievance or whether his remedy was through the disciplinary appeal 
process.  We need not decide whether there was any ambiguity in the prison’s policies 
because, as noted by the District Court, the record reflects that Brown did not raise his 
excessive force claim in his appeal of the finding of misconduct.  Thus, even if Brown 
could have exhausted his administrative remedies through his disciplinary appeals, he did 
not do so. 
 Brown also argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment 
because there is a disputed factual issue as to whether he complied with the prison’s 
grievance procedures.  As noted above, the defendants submitted declarations 
establishing that the person responsible for responding to grievances at Brown’s 
institution did not receive a grievance from him regarding the January 29, 2008 incident, 
and that the Department of Corrections did not have a record of such a grievance.  Brown 
submitted grievance forms to show that he did in fact try to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.   
 We conclude that the grievance forms submitted by Brown are insufficient to raise 
a genuine issue of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing.  See Small, 728 F.3d at 271 
(holding court may resolve factual disputes on questions of exhaustion).  Brown states in 
his brief that on February 1, 2008 a correctional officer picked up his grievance, that he 
saw the officer place it in the grievance box, and that Peter Damiter collected grievances 
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from the box the next day.  Brown, however, does not point to an affidavit or any other 
evidence of record supporting these assertions.     
 Brown also recognized in his brief in opposition to the summary judgment motion 
that an inmate usually receives a return copy of a grievance from the grievance 
coordinator within one to two days of submission, but the record does not reflect that he 
asked about the fact that he did not receive a return copy, which would have provided a 
tracking number and proof that he did in fact submit his grievance.  The defendants also 
submitted evidence showing that one of the grievances the prison did receive from Brown 
in 2008 was rejected because he had falsified the date in order for the grievance to appear 
timely.  Ex. C-2 to Summary Judgment Motion.  We hold that summary judgment was 
warranted under the circumstances of this case.  
 Finally, Brown appeals a District Court order declining to set aside a ruling 
deeming his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint withdrawn.  The record 
reflects that Brown filed his motion after the defendants had answered his amended 
complaint.  The District Court deemed the motion withdrawn because Brown had not 
filed a supporting brief as required by the court’s local rules.  Almost three months later, 
Brown moved the District Court to set aside the order.  Brown stated that correctional 
officers had confiscated the brief because he had refused to show it to them.  In denying 
Brown’s motion, the District Court stated that it appeared that Brown’s own conduct was 
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the cause of his failure to timely file a brief, that Brown had waited three months to notify 
the court, and that it was not clear that a properly-filed motion would have been granted. 
 Brown moved to set aside the District Court’s order pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b) and the District Court evaluated the motion under Rule 60(b)’s 
standards.  Rule 60(b) is inapplicable because Brown did not seek relief from a final 
judgment.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).  Brown, however, suffered no prejudice in not being 
able to file his proposed second amended complaint.  The record reflects that Brown 
sought to revise his due process claim, which had been dismissed, add factual allegations 
regarding injuries suffered as a result of the January 29, 2008 incident, and add as a 
defendant a correctional officer identified in the defendants’ answer as being part of the 
escort team.  As explained in the District Court’s order granting the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss, Brown’s sanction did not implicate a protected liberty interest and he does not 
have a viable due process claim.  For the reasons stated herein, Brown is unable to pursue 
his excessive force claim.    
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
